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Quantum key distribution (QKD) has the potential to improve communications security by offering cryp-
tographic keys whose security relies on the fundamental properties of quantum physics. The use of a trusted
quantum receiver on an orbiting satellite is the most practical near-term solution to the challenge of achieving
long-distance (global-scale) QKD, currently limited to a few hundred kilometers on the ground. This scenario
presents unique challenges, such as high photon losses and restricted classical data transmission and processing
power due to the limitations of a typical satellite platform. Here we demonstrate the feasibility of such a system
by implementing a QKD protocol, with optical transmission and full post-processing, in the high-loss regime
using minimized computing hardware at the receiver. Employing weak coherent pulses with decoy states, we
demonstrate the production of secure key bits at up to 56.5dB of photon loss. We further illustrate the feasi-
bility of a satellite uplink by generating secure key while experimentally emulating the varying channel losses
predicted for realistic low-Earth-orbit satellite passes at 600km altitude. With a 76MHz source and including
finite-size analysis, we extract 3374 bits of secure key from the best pass. We also illustrate the potential benefit
of combining multiple passes together: while one suboptimal “upper-quartile” pass produces no finite-sized
key with our source, the combination of three such passes allows us to extract 165 bits of secure key. Alterna-
tively, we find that by increasing the signal rate to 300MHz it would be possible to extract 21570 bits of secure
finite-sized key in just a single upper-quartile pass.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers communications
security without reliance on computational presumptions by
taking advantage of fundamental properties of quantum me-
chanics [1, 2]. Despite reaching maturity that supports
commercial implementation [3, 4], QKD has yet to achieve
widespread use, in large part owing to distance limitations,
on the order of 200km, inherent to lossy terrestrial trans-
missions [5–11]. Quantum repeaters [12] promise to over-
come this shortcoming, but they require high-fidelity quan-
tum memories which are still in the fundamental research
stage [13, 14] and are not yet viable for real-world applica-
tion. Alternatively, quantum links to orbiting satellites can be
implemented using existing technologies [15–19].
One near-term approach to satellite-based QKD is where a
satellite, acting as a trusted node, performs two consecutive
quantum key exchanges with two different ground stations. A
combination of the two keys is then publicly revealed, allow-
ing one ground station to extract the other’s key, giving both
locations a shared key in a way that no other party (except
for the satellite) can surreptitiously intercept. This approach
may be implemented with either uplink (photons sent from
ground station transmitter to satellite receiver) or downlink
(photons sent from satellite transmitter to ground station re-
ceiver). The feasibility of both of these has been extensively
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studied [18–21]. While a downlink benefits from lower trans-
mission losses, allowing higher key rates, an uplink offers the
advantage of a simpler satellite design, easier pointing, re-
duced on-board data collection requirements, and source flex-
ibility, which makes an uplink the preferred scenario for sci-
entific study [19, 22].
A significant challenge in the uplink scenario is operating
with the high photon loss experienced (40dB to 60dB). Pre-
vious work demonstrated that key extraction is possible, in
principle, beyond 50dB of loss in the infinite key limit [22].
However, this work did not perform all of the steps necessary
to implement the QKD protocol and produce a secure key. (In-
deed, experimental QKD demonstrations routinely go no fur-
ther than calculate the expected length of the secure key based
on observed parameters.) Here we experimentally demon-
strate key extraction at various transmission loss levels, up
to 56.5dB, while including all the QKD processing steps re-
quired to finally extract a secure key. We also examine the ef-
fect of finite statistics, and assess the time required to achieve
near-asymptotic key rates in the high-loss environment. Fur-
ther, we show the feasibility of ground–satellite QKD by ex-
perimentally recreating the varying losses of three realistic up-
link satellite passes.
Our apparatus has the two parties involved in the high-loss
QKD transmission operating independently, each party having
separate event time-taggers, global positioning system (GPS)
receivers, and classical processing mediated by a classical
communication channel. Because we focus on a future satel-
lite implantation, computational requirements are also a key
aspect. The system we have developed attempts to reduce, as
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2much as possible, these requirements at the receiver. We ana-
lyze the complexity of the classical processing functions, and
demonstrate operation on low-power embedded hardware. We
show that the requirements are feasible, making our overall
design suitable for a satellite payload.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II details the
steps of the QKD protocol and the approaches we have taken
to optimize it for a satellite uplink. Section III describes
the experimental apparatus we constructed to perform our
demonstrations. Section IV presents the results in two parts:
Section IV A shows the results of our computational analy-
sis, while Section IV B shows the results of our experimental
QKD demonstration. We close with discussion and conclu-
sion in Section V.
II. IMPLEMENTING QKD WITH LIMITED RESOURCES
A. BB84 with decoy states
The seminal QKD protocol, BB84 [1] encodes information
in the polarization states of single photons. Ideally, at each
time-step Alice randomly selects one of four polarizations in
two bases—horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal (D), or anti-
diagonal (A)—and sends a photon with this polarization to
Bob. Bob randomly selects a basis, H/V or D/A, and measures
the photon to obtain one of four outcomes. This procedure
occurs for many time-steps, and after revealing the bases used,
Alice and Bob “sift” their events, discarding those which have
mismatched bases. By defining H and D to correspond to a
bit value of 0, and V and A to correspond to a bit value of
1, Alice and Bob retain a common string of random bits—the
sifted key [2].
Practical implementations have extra complications: pho-
tons are lost in transmission, imperfections in photon source
and detection devices introduce errors (which must be cor-
rected), and weak coherent pulse sources, which are often
used in place of true single-photon sources, exhibit potentially
insecure multi-photon emission events. Decoy-state proto-
cols [23], with error correction and privacy amplification as
classical post-processing steps, have been developed to over-
come these issues.
Theoretical QKD security proofs provide equations for the
secure key rate based on experimentally measurable parame-
ters such as the quantum bit error ratio (QBER), background
noise counts, and decoy parameters. These allow us to make a
statement about the security of the final key after the quantum
transmission is complete. Most importantly, these equations
determine the amount of privacy amplification required to be
able to claim ε security [24, 25]. Once the post-processing is
complete and the final key deemed secure, it can then be used
in a classical encryption protocol such as one-time pad.
We implement the vacuum+weak decoy-state protocol [23],
in which Alice randomly emits signal states with average pho-
ton number µ , or decoy states that are either vacuum or have
an average photon number ν < µ . In our implementation
(Fig. 1), Alice employs polarization and intensity modula-
tion [26] to prepare a random sequence of BB84 polarization
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FIG. 1. Schematic overview of our high-loss QKD apparatus. The
source at Alice produces weak coherent pulses with wavelength
532nm that possess both the short pulse length of the mode-locked
810nm laser and the polarization state of the 1550nm continuous
wave laser. The quantum channel consists of a movable lens after the
fixed output of an optical fiber to adjust the beam divergence over the
free-space link. Computational performance of the tagging, process-
ing and driving in Bob is limited to simulate the available resources
of a satellite-based QKD receiver payload.
encodings which are 92% signal and 8% decoy states. Our
average photon numbers are µ ≈ 0.5 and ν ≈ 0.05, which are
near the optimal for this protocol. (Further details of the ap-
paratus are given in Section III.)
The lower bound for the final asymptotic secure key rate
per laser pulse is [23]
R∞ = qKµ
{−Qµ fECH2(Eµ)+QL1 [1−H2(EU1 )]} . (1)
Here, q is a basis reconciliation factor (1/2 for BB84), Kµ is
the fraction of pulses that are signal states, fEC is the effi-
ciency parameter of the error correction algorithm, H2 is the
binary entropy function, Qµ/ν is the gain for signal/decoy
states (the ratio of number of photons detected by Bob to
number of pulses sent by Alice), Eµ/ν is the QBER for sig-
nal/decoy states (ascertained in the error correction process),
and QL1 and E
U
1 are the lower bound of the gain and the upper
bound of the QBER, respectively, for single-photon pulses.
The single-photon gain lower bound QL1 is calculated as
QL1 =
µ2e−µ
µν−ν2
(
Qνeν −Qµeµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2−ν2
µ2
Y0
)
(2)
where Y0 is the vacuum yield, determined by the cumula-
tive probability of detector dark counts and background noise
within the coincidence window. The single-photon QBER up-
per bound EU1 is calculated as [23, 27]
EU,µ1 =
EµQµ
QL1
− E0Y0
QL1 e
µ (3)
EU,ν1 =
EνQνeν −E0Y0
νQL1
µe−µ (4)
EU1 = min
{
EU,µ1 ,E
U,ν
1
}
(5)
3where E0 is the vacuum error rate (1/2 in a perfect apparatus).
In the present work, the parameters in equations (1)–(5) are
determined from experimental data to obtain the asymptotic
lower bound for the secret key rate per laser pulse, R∞. To
obtain the secure key rate in bits per second, R∞ is multiplied
by the pulse rate of the WCP source.
Proper generation of a secure key needs to incorporate the
effects of statistical fluctuations due to finite-sized experimen-
tal data [28]. To account for this we use the common heuristic
of adding or subtracting 10σ variation from the experimental
parameters in such a way as to minimize the key rate [29]. (A
recently proposed method may allow to account for statistical
fluctuation in a more rigorous fashion [30].) Finite-size se-
curity effects are captured [31] by the security parameter ∆,
resulting in a key rate lower bound
R = qKµ
{
−Qµ fECH2(Eµ)
+QL1
[
1−H2(EU1 )
]−Qµ∆/Nµ} (6)
where ∆ = 7
√
Nµ log2[2/(ε¯− ε¯ ′)]− 2log2[2(ε − εEC − ε¯)],
εEC is the error correction silent failure probability (we use
10−10), Nµ is the raw key size, and ε¯ and ε¯ ′ are numerically
optimized for R, constrained by ε− εEC > ε¯ > ε¯ ′ ≥ 0.
B. Distribution of post-processing tasks
The design of our classical post-processing software fol-
lows the principle that Alice should perform as many of the
computationally intensive tasks as possible, as the ground sta-
tion can be made rich in computing resources, compared to
the limited capacity of a satellite payload. In our system, Al-
ice, being the source of the optical signal over the high-loss
link, is responsible for high-rate data readout. She also per-
forms timing analysis (to match Bob’s classically transmit-
ted time-tagged photon detection events to her time-tagged
source events) and basis sifting, afterwards sending simpli-
fied coincidence information back to Bob. We also choose
a one-way error correction algorithm based on low-density
parity-check codes [32], in which Alice performs the com-
putationally expensive decoding algorithm while Bob only
runs a linear algorithm to compute his syndromes (see Sec-
tion II D). This scheme has the additional advantage of hav-
ing low classical communication overhead. Finally, both par-
ties perform a Toeplitz-matrix-based [33] privacy amplifica-
tion routine suitable for low-power hardware implementation
(see Section II E).
We separate Bob’s software into two components: a driv-
ing control environment, and an embedded processing com-
ponent. The driving control component is responsible for
all platform-dependent tasks, e.g. loading time-tagger oper-
ating system drivers, configuring time-taggers, reading out
time-tags and displaying live statistics. To be suitable for im-
plantation into a yet-to-be-designed satellite, Bob’s embedded
processing component is implemented in a platform-agnostic
way using a portable low-level language (C). It is executed as
a separate process on an x86-64 desktop computer, or on a
low-power ARM development board, and performs the bulk
of Bob’s necessary processing tasks.
Because Bob’s embedded component runs in a standalone
process, its usage of computing resources can be accurately
monitored. Moreover, the driving control component records
the bandwidth used for classical communication. This design
allows us to make an accurate assessment of the classical post-
processing requirements and guide our analysis of the com-
puting requirements of Bob’s part of the QKD protocol.
C. Time synchronization and basis sifting
Several practical issues complicate the process of determin-
ing which time-tagged photon detections correspond to par-
ticular source events, including initial clock synchronization,
drift over time, and variation in photon time-of-flight. For
our apparatus, an extra complication is that our data acqui-
sition hardware is not capable of operating at the high pulse
frequency of the laser source (see Section III).
To reduce the heavy load on the time-tagger at the source,
only a subset of the laser’s output pulses are time-tagged. With
Alice utilizing a predefined (known only to Alice) random-
ized sequence of pulse states, we assume that the laser’s pe-
riod is stable on the order of µs, and interpolate to reconstruct
the transmitted states for timing analysis. The predefined se-
quence is not a requirement of the time-tagger but is necessary
due to limitations of the modulation electronics at the source,
which require a preloaded sequence.
To reduce clock drift, we align the time-tagging units’ in-
ternal clocks to a 10MHz time-base signal provided by a GPS
receiver at each site. Initial synchronization is achieved with
the one pulse per second (1PPS) signal provided by the GPS
receivers. Position data is supplied with these signals, which
can be used in conjunction with time data to estimate the dis-
tance between Alice and Bob, and hence, the time-of-flight of
the photons between the source and the receiver.
In our system, photon detections are tagged with a res-
olution of 156.25ps, but the 1PPS signals are accurate to
≈100ns. Additional analysis is required to identify corre-
sponding emission and detection events to within a desired
coincidence window of about 0.1ns to 1.3ns. The algorithm
to achieve this synchronization utilizes the timing informa-
tion from Bob’s time-tags, Alice’s transmitted photon states,
Alice’s and Bob’s GPS timing and position data, as well as a
small subset (≈5%) of Bob’s measured outcomes. Alice em-
ploys a histogram-based optimizing coincidence search within
a predefined time span (about 100ns). The subset of Bob’s re-
vealed measured outcomes (which are discarded from the fi-
nal key) are also used to estimate the QBER to commence the
error correction stage of the QKD protocol.
Once coincident events have been identified and noncoinci-
dent events removed, Alice performs basis sifting of her raw
key to produce her sifted key and transmits a list of indices to
Bob, which he utilizes to equivalently sift (for both time and
basis, simultaneously) his photon detection events.
4D. Error correction
Low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes are highly suitable
for satellite-based QKD due to the low communication over-
head required and the inherent asymmetry in the computa-
tional complexity at each site. First, Alice prepares an M×N
irregular [34] parity-check matrix, where N is the sifted key
block size, and M is based on the QBER estimate obtained
during timing analysis. We use progressive-edge growth soft-
ware [34] (modified from [35]), employing known optimal de-
gree distribution profiles [36, 37], to generate the parity-check
matrix. Alice then transmits the matrix in a compact form to
Bob over a classical channel. For each N-bit block of his sifted
key, Bob runs an efficient linear algorithm to compute a syn-
drome using this matrix, and transmits it to Alice.
Alice then attempts to reconcile her sifted key assum-
ing that Bob’s sifted key is “correct” (it remains unchanged
throughout this process). For each block of sifted key, Al-
ice’s goal is to resolve Bob’s key vector x, based on her key
vector y, Bob’s syndrome s, the parity-check matrix, and the
estimated QBER. To accomplish this task, Alice employs be-
lief propagation, an iterative message passing decoding algo-
rithm, also known as the sum-product algorithm [38, 39]. Our
sum-product LDPC decoder is written in C# and is based on
that found in [40]. Upon success, Alice and Bob both pos-
sess the N-bit error-corrected key block kEC = x and obtain
the exact QBER for the quantum transmission, Eµ .
By Shannon’s channel coding theorem [41] applied to the
binary symmetric channel [42], we can deduce a closed-form
estimate of the appropriate size of the LDPC matrix based
on the (estimated, denoted by a tilde) QBER [43]: M =
N fECH2(E˜µ). The decoding step may yet terminate unsuc-
cessfully with a given matrix and key block—the probability
of this decreases as M (and thus fEC) is increased. In the case
of such a termination, we may either discard the key block or
retry the algorithm with an augmented matrix containing all
the rows of the previous matrix, similar to the “nested” LDPC
codes proposed in [44]. In a satellite mission, the choice can
be based on the availability of the classical communication
channel. Our implementation exhibits efficiencies ( fEC) rang-
ing from 1.1 to 1.5.
The silent failure probability of the belief propagation
procedure—i.e., the probability that the process terminates
successfully but there remains one or more uncorrected bits—
is not well characterized in existing literature. While we have
not observed any silent failures during our testing, we cannot
be certain that εEC = 10−10 is achieved. To ensure such cer-
tainty, one could calculate, reveal, and compare a fingerprint
hash of x and kEC. (Such an approach using 128-bit MD5
sums [45], for example, yields a collision probability, and thus
a silent failure probability, of order 2−128 ≈ 3×10−39.) To ac-
count for the revealed bits, the final key length would need to
be reduced by the same (constant) number of bits. Because
the necessity of these extra steps and the specific method of
implementation are unclear, we do not perform these steps
here.
E. Privacy amplification
The error-corrected key block kEC is only partially secure,
as some information may have leaked to an eavesdropper
(Eve)—we attribute the observed QBER to Eve’s interaction
with the signal, and all parity information communicated dur-
ing error correction is known to Eve as it was transmitted over
a public channel. Privacy amplification is employed to create
a new, final, key kF on which Eve no longer holds more than
negligible amount of information. The procedure consists of
applying a two-universal hash function [2, 46] to kEC to pro-
duce a provably secure key block kF of length L < N (recall
N is the sifted key block size). L is obtained by multiplying
R of Eq. (6) by the number of pulses sent. For mitigating the
nonlinear length reduction due to finite-size effects, N should
be kept above a certain value, typically ∼105, as finite-size
effects heavily impact keys with lower N. This value is taken
into consideration when selecting a hash function.
Privacy amplification is a symmetric operation which needs
to be performed by both Alice and Bob. The choice of hash
function dictates the computational complexity of the process
and the amount of classical communication required. In our
implementation, the privacy amplification procedure loosely
follows the methodology outlined in [46]—however, we have
made some alterations to their model and developed a differ-
ent matrix multiplication procedure suitable for efficient im-
plementation in hardware. Briefly, we employ the Toeplitz
matrix [47] construction implemented using a shift register.
A Toeplitz matrix has constant descending left-to-right di-
agonal elements. An L×N Toeplitz matrix can be written as
Tr =

rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN+L−1
rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN+L−2
...
. . .
...
r2 · · · rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · · · · rN+1
r1 r2 · · · rL−1 rL rL+1 · · · rN
 .
(7)
A Toeplitz matrix is a two-universal hash function [33]. Note
that a Toeplitz matrix Tr is completely defined by the (N +
L−1)-bit vector r = (r1,r2, . . . ,rN+L−1), thus its storage and
transmission requirements are considerably reduced. Further,
an L×N matrix of the form Ur = (IL|Tr), i.e. a concatena-
tion of an L-dimensional identity matrix IL and an L×(N−L)
Toeplitz matrix Tr, is also a two-universal hash function as we
require, but requires only N−1 bits to define [48, 49].
Following error correction, Alice generates such a matrix
by constructing a random binary string r = (r1,r2, . . . ,rN−1)
of length N − 1, and then transmits r to Bob over the clas-
sical channel. Alice and Bob then use r and a shift register
to apply the hash matrix Ur, computing the final secure key,
kF =UrkEC.
In our implementation, the identity portion of each row of
Ur uses no space and can be accounted for with a simple logi-
cal AND operation. We represent Tr as an (N−L)-bit logical
shift register. Initially, the shift register contains the last N−L
bits of r, (rL,rL+1, . . . ,rN−1). The remaining bits from r are
used as input for the shift register. In this way, we conserve
memory by never needing to store full matrices.
5The logical shift register is broken up into multiple 32-bit
blocks, each of which is designed to fit inside a register on a
processing unit. The register size of 32 bits is chosen for the
support of multiple platforms, including our low-power ARM
test board. 64-bit platforms are also available, and with single
instruction, multiple data (SIMD) extensions, commonplace
in contemporary desktop processors, the register could be 256
bits or larger.
After privacy amplification, Alice and Bob are left with a
secure key of L bits which can then be used to encrypt data
transmitted on a classical channel through, e.g., one-time pad.
We assume here that channel authentication is performed sep-
arately, possibly using some of the secure key (reducing the
length available for encryption).
III. APPARATUS
Our QKD system, shown in Fig. 1, consists of a weak co-
herent pulse (WCP) source, a variable-loss free-space chan-
nel, and a compact four-outcome (two passively chosen mea-
surement bases) quantum receiver. The source utilizes up-
conversion (sum frequency generation) from two orthogonally
oriented type-I periodically poled potassium titanyl phosphate
(PPKTP) crystals to produce photon pulses at 532nm wave-
length from a mode-locked Ti:sapphire laser at 810nm, op-
erating at a rate of 76MHz, and a continuous-wave laser at
1550nm.
Diagonally polarized 810nm laser pulses are combined
with polarization- and intensity-modulated 1550nm laser light
(controlled by efficient telecom waveguide modulators [26])
to generate 532nm pulses possessing the short pulse width
and high repetition rate of the 810nm laser, as well as the in-
tensity and polarization of the 1550nm light. Phase random-
ization between pulses, necessary to ensure security, is pro-
vided by the short coherence time of the 1550nm laser (less
than the pulsing period of the 810nm laser, but much more
than the pulse duration). Birefringent wedges precompensate
the 810nm light for temporal walk-off in the PPKTP crystals.
The photon pulses produced are coupled into single-mode
fiber. A fiber splitter sends ≈0.3% of photons to a thick-
silicon avalanche photodiode (Excelitas SPCM-AQ4C) to
measure the average photon number per pulse. The remaining
photons are sent to a free-space quantum channel consisting
of a bare fiber output followed by a 3-inch-diameter lens on a
longitudinal translation stage. The loss is adjusted by varying
the position of the lens, changing the amount of light directed
into the receiver by making the beam more or less divergent.
The quantum receiver, Fig. 2, is built using Thorlabs’ cage
system. The receiving telescope consists of a 5cm diame-
ter, 25cm focal length collection lens followed by a 6.5mm
diameter, 11mm focal length collimating lens. Passive mea-
surement basis choice is implemented by coupling polariza-
tion discrimination apparatuses to two orthogonal outputs of
a pentaprism beam-splitter, each of which transmits approxi-
mately 47.5% of the injected power. (A pentaprism was cho-
sen for potential application in future experiments—a 50:50
beam-splitter would also suffice as we do not here use the pen-
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FIG. 2. High-loss QKD receiver. Photons are captured by the tele-
scope and pass through motorized-rotating half- and quarter-wave
plates, correcting unwanted polarization rotations. The pentaprism
beam-splitter provides a passive basis choice between rectilinear and
diagonal polarization bases. A polarizing beam-splitter (PBS) in
each basis arm discriminates H/V and D/A polarized photons, the
latter by physically orienting the PBS 45° around the beam path. An
extra PBS in each reflected arm reduces erroneous counts from de-
vice imperfections. Lenses focus the beams onto single-photon de-
tectors, while band-pass filters reduce background light.
taprism’s third output.)
Polarization analysis is done by a 5mm cubic polarizing
beam-splitter (PBS) in each arm, directing photons to one of
four detector assemblies. Measurement in the diagonal basis
is obtained by physically orienting (to 45°) the PBS and de-
tectors around the beam path, relative to the other PBS (which
defines the rectilinear basis). Following each analysis PBS,
a second PBS, oriented at 90°, is used to suppress erroneous
optical signal in the reflected path (owing to device imperfec-
tion).
Each detector assembly contains a spatial-filtering shield
and a 2nm band-pass filter to suppress background noise.
Photons are focused by 6cm focal length lenses and detected
by thin-Si avalanche photodiodes from Micro Photon Devices,
which feature good detection efficiency (≈50%), low dark
counts (≈20cps) and low jitter (≤50ps). Temporal filtering
with a narrow (∼1ns) time window allows us to accept sig-
nal photons while rejecting remaining background and dark
counts with high fidelity. The background yield Y0 is esti-
mated by counting photon detections between pulses. Though
this approach is known to be insecure, it suffices for our proof-
of-concept demonstration.
Data are acquired by two time-tagger units, and processed
by two x86-64 computers (and, when testing algorithmic per-
formance, an ARM board) on a local-area network (LAN).
Each time-tagger unit is connected to 10MHz and 1PPS sig-
nals coming from a GPS receiver. The signals from the source
are connected to Alice’s time-tagger and the four outputs of
Bob’s detectors are connected to Bob’s time-tagger.
Our receiver also includes an arbitrary polarization rotation
6assembly, consisting of quarter-wave plates (QWPs) before
and after a half-wave plate (HWP) mounted in motorized ro-
tation stages, allowing the compensation of any unitary po-
larization change in the channel. We have developed an auto-
mated polarization alignment protocol which characterizes the
effect of the channel on the known QKD polarization states,
measuring the quantum signal directly, sufficient to then deter-
mine an optimal compensation implemented by the arbitrary
polarization rotation assembly.
IV. RESULTS
A. Post-processing resource requirements
For a satellite uplink scenario, optical signals are sent from
the ground when the satellite orbits over an optical ground sta-
tion, while classical communication is performed—possibly
at a later time—when the satellite orbits over one or more ra-
dio frequency (RF) ground stations. Hence, the satellite sys-
tem must store all time-tags accumulated during the optical
station flyover, performing all classical steps of the QKD pro-
tocol during an RF station flyover when a classical communi-
cation link is present. Specifically, Bob must store: time-tags,
measurement bases, photon detections (bit values), and data
defining the error correction LDPC matrix and privacy ampli-
fication Toeplitz matrix.
Our time-tagging hardware produces 64-bit time-tags. To
save on the limited memory and classical communications
bandwidth available to a satellite, it is possible to reduce that
number significantly, at the expense of additional computation
steps. One simple scheme is to store the full time-tag only at
the beginning of every second of data collection, together with
additional information provided by the GPS receiver (which
outputs a data packet every second). In this way, the space
required to store the time-tag and measurement outcome in-
formation is 40 bits.
To further save memory and classical communications
bandwidth, the sparse LDPC matrix for error correction can
be efficiently transmitted and stored as an adjacency list where
only the indices of each non-zero element in each row are
recorded. If the decoding step fails, we must then retry with
a larger matrix (or discard the block), implying an increase of
fEC, i.e., worse efficiency.
The embedded processing component of the satellite-side
software is tested on an inexpensive (≈$150), low-power
(2W) Freescale i.MX53 QSB single-board computer featur-
ing a 1GHz single-core ARM processor and 1GiB of RAM.
The measured performance, Table I, illustrates successful op-
eration within reasonable resource constraints. We have found
that in our system the limiting factor for Bob is the privacy
amplification step, which requires a relatively long processing
time. For all other processes, the limiting factor is not Bob’s
computational power, but rather Alice’s, and the 100Mbit Eth-
ernet link between them. A future implementation could have
a far more powerful computer at Alice than what we have used
for our demonstration.
For computational requirements analysis, we collect exper-
TABLE I. Measured performance of the satellite-side QKD process
running on a Freescale i.MX53 embedded ARM board processing
300 seconds of QKD data (28.8dB loss data with rate-limiting ap-
plied; see text). Here, privacy amplification is applied without in-
corporating finite-size effects which reduce secure key length, giving
us upper bounds on resource usage. As expected, processing time
scales quadratically with the photon detection rate—a least-squares
quadratic fit gives a coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9992.
Detection Sifted key QBER Processing RAM used
rate [Hz] rate [Hz] [%] time [s] [Mbyte]
500 229 3.43 0.5 11.19
1000 457 3.44 1.1 20.42
5000 2326 3.53 14.5 70.09
10000 4647 3.57 56.3 71.70
20000 9286 3.55 772.1 75.47
30000 13924 3.54 2013.1 79.38
41887 19428 3.54 3969.4 84.52
imental data for 300 seconds at a receiver detection rate of
about 42kHz. Each one-second chunk of this data is then
truncated to produce various effective detection rates. Table I
shows detailed memory and CPU usage for the embedded
processing component. Privacy amplification complexity is
asymptotically quadratic in the block size N due to the matrix
multiplication process, while all other post-processing steps
behave linearly. Hence, we expect the processing time of the
QKD post-processing to overall scale quadratically with the
detections, as is observed. Note that we do not expect the
number of detections to exceed 1×107 over a single satellite
pass using feasible quantum sources [19].
B. Experimental secure key extraction
We perform the experimental demonstration for losses
ranging from 28.8 to almost 60dB, determined from the pho-
ton detection rate (corrected for background) with respect to
the transmitted optical power. The loss therefore includes both
channel loss (variable) and receiver efficiency (fixed 1.5dB
for receiver optics and 3dB for detector efficiency). The tem-
poral filter window width is adjusted to improve the secure
key rate for each value of loss, and ranges from 1.3ns at low
loss to 0.1ns at high loss. The measured QBER of signal
states ranges from 1.94% to 6.06%, with raw key rate (to-
tal detections within the temporal filter window, per second)
ranging from 38211Hz at 28.8dB to 44.2Hz at 56.5dB, while
the background detection rate ranges from 151Hz to 2.38Hz
(see Fig. 3).
Our experimental results incorporate the full error correc-
tion and privacy amplification post-processing. To limit com-
putational time we artificially restricted the error correction
block size to 600000 (with the sifted key split into the nec-
essary number of blocks). Privacy amplification was imple-
mented over the full sifted-key length of error-corrected key
bits in order to minimize finite size effects. We achieve er-
ror correction efficiencies between 1.12 and 1.50 (with better
efficiencies at higher QBER, as predicted by [50]) and pri-
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FIG. 3. Measured raw key rate, background detection rate and QBER
obtained in different loss regimes, with a source pulsing at 76MHz.
The raw key and background rates include only detections that fall
within the temporal filter window. The background rate (the product
of the vacuum yield Y0 and the pulsed laser frequency) is determined
by measuring the counts received between laser pulses. At lower
loss, the background term is dominated by light from the 1550nm
laser and some continuous wave component remaining in the pulsed
810nm laser. Variations in QBER between runs are mainly due to
laboratory temperature fluctuations which affected the birefringence
of the optical fiber and the performance of the 1550nm modulators.
Loss includes both channel loss (variable) and receiver efficiency
(fixed 4.5dB).
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FIG. 4. Secure key rate (lower bound) in the infinite limit for data
measured in different loss regimes. The secure key rate tends to de-
crease as the loss increases, with some fluctuation about the trend due
to variations in the source tuning and channel parameters throughout
the data collection campaign. Loss includes both channel loss and
receiver efficiency.
vacy amplification to ε = 10−9 security. The extracted se-
cure key rate is shown in Fig. 4 for asymptotic extrapolations
to the infinite limit of key length (Eq. (1)). At the highest
loss, 56.5dB, our system is able to extract 0.5bit/s of secure
key in the asymptotic limit. This is comparable to the re-
sult of a previous high-loss demonstration [22] which reached
2bit/s at 57dB (the achievable rate there being inferred with-
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FIG. 5. Finite-sized secure key rate as a fraction of the correspond-
ing asymptotic secure key rate, given the total number of laser pulses
transmitted. Curves are shown for experimental parameters corre-
sponding to each of the loss conditions demonstrated, as indicated by
labels beside each curve. Crosses indicate the value that was reached
in the experiment. Lowest losses only require around 1010 pulses
to exceed 80% of the asymptotic key rate. For the highest losses to
reach this amount, significantly more pulses, 1014 to 1015, must be
transmitted due to the reduced signal-to-noise. Note these curves in-
dicate secure key rates relative to those that could be achieved in the
asymptotic limit, not absolute rates.
out implementing the complete QKD protocol). We note that
the key rate can be readily improved by employing a faster
source—QKD WCP sources have been demonstrated in the
GHz range [5, 51], more than an order of magnitude above
our 76MHz source rate.
Given that the apparatus remains sufficiently stable, the par-
ticular finite duration over which data are collected in this ex-
periment is arbitrary. For our results, each data run lasts 5min
to 10min. With such times, when incorporating finite-size
statistics (Eq. (6)) we find positive secure key rates for points
up to 45.6dB. For higher losses, there is insufficient statistics
to produce nonzero key under the condition of 10σ worst-case
variation. As the detriment of finite-size effects is due to the
limited number of photon counts, a faster source can also mit-
igate this.
Based on the measured experimental parameters, we can
extrapolate the raw key rates and determine the achievable
finite-size secure key rate if the apparatus was run for longer
times or multiple runs under the same conditions were con-
catenated. Figure 5 shows the ratio of the asymptotic key
rate that can be achieved by the finite secure key (R/R∞),
for a given total number of pulses transmitted, for each ex-
perimental loss condition we examine. For the lowest losses,
only about 1010 pulses is necessary to reach over 80% of the
asymptotic key rate, equating to a few minutes of collection
time with our 76MHz source. More time is required for higher
losses: several weeks of continuous collection at 76MHz, for
the highest losses. Interestingly, we find that the 34.9dB data
produces nonzero secure key sooner than the 28.8dB data—
this is owing to the relatively high QBER at 28.8dB. Our
results consistently show a significantly higher decoy QBER
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FIG. 6. Experimentally measured loss over the 45min data collec-
tion used to simulate the varying loss of a satellite pass. The data
are smoothed by taking the median value of a 29s moving win-
dow. These smoothed values are used to select experimental data
that tracks the theoretical loss of a satellite pass while maintaining
the natural statistical fluctuations.
compared to the signal QBER. This was caused by the inten-
sity modulator which was found to produce a slight polariza-
tion shift that is dependent on the applied modulation, causing
the two different intensity levels to have slightly different po-
larizations before being polarization modulated, leading to a
difference in the optimal alignment for the two intensity lev-
els. This polarization shift could be corrected by the addition
of a polarizer after the intensity modulator, eliminating the
polarization difference between the two states. Although this
difference does not invalidate our proof-of-concept demon-
stration, removing it is crucial in a secure implementation as
it leads to distinguishability between signal and decoy states
which could be used by an eavesdropper to gain information.
Removing this difference may also improve final key rates as
it would reduce decoy QBER without affecting signal QBER.
Our system alignment is optimized for the signal QBER.
The results presented here are comparable to the regime of
a satellite uplink, where the usable part of a pass is expected to
vary typically between 40dB to 55dB loss [19], and help sup-
port the conclusion that our approach is suitable for eventual
satellite implantation (though a faster source may be advised).
To more closely examine the feasibility of our approach in
the regime of a satellite uplink for QKD, we simulate sev-
eral satellite passes by varying the position of the quantum-
channel lens (thus varying the loss) during an experimental
run. We do this once, the total run lasting approximately
45 minutes, with the loss changing smoothly from ≈63dB to
a minimum of ≈28dB after about 21 minutes, and then back
to ≈62dB over the remaining time. The data accumulated
are segmented into 1s blocks, with the measured loss for each
second over the duration of the experiment shown in Fig. 6.
We redistribute select 1s blocks of raw key data in such a
way that we obtain data sets that reproduce the statistics ex-
pected for real satellite uplink orbits [19]. The passes consid-
ered are the best, upper-quartile and median passes (in terms
of contact time) over a hypothetical ground station located at
45° latitude of a year-long 600km circular Sun-synchronous
low Earth orbit. The predicted losses are based on uplink at
a wavelength of 785nm, with a receiver diameter of 30cm,
a 2µrad pointing error and a rural sea-level atmosphere. The
differences with our system (which has 532nm wavelength
and 5cm receiver diameter) are necessary to mitigate the in-
creased geometric losses over the long distance link of a satel-
lite (requiring larger receiver diameter) and the effect of atmo-
spheric turbulence and transmission (reduced at 785nm com-
pared to 532nm). Both our 532nm system and the expected
785nm system utilize the same Si avalanche photodiode tech-
nology. Analyzing our experimental data possessing these
theoretical losses is therefore a valid proof-of-concept demon-
stration.
The experimental data are smoothed by taking the median
of a moving window of 29s width, the result illustrated in
Fig. 6. We use these smoothed data to select 1s experimental
data blocks to include in our analysis for each orbit by pro-
gressively scanning (from the center, in either direction) in 1s
steps for the next 1s data block that possesses smoothed loss
matching or exceeding the theoretical orbit loss prediction. By
selecting experimental data at points where the smoothed loss
is matched to theoretical link predictions, we ensure that the
data we sample are not biased by normal fluctuations in mea-
sured loss.
Figure 7 shows the three relevant losses—the theoreti-
cally predicted loss, the smoothed loss value at the sampled
point, and the experimentally measured loss from the sam-
pled point—and the estimated QBER for each representative
pass. The measured losses of the sampled experimental data
closely match the trend of the theoretical prediction, whilst
maintaining realistic fluctuation. At higher losses the per-
second QBER estimate has significant fluctuations due to the
reduced sample size.
Performing the post-processing steps on these data sets
and incorporating finite-sized statistics, we are able to ex-
tract a 3374bit secure key from the best pass, out of a total
of 544056bit raw key (643521 detection events) with an av-
erage of 3.1% QBER in the signal. This result shows that
even with our modest 76MHz source a positive key rate can
feasibly be generated from one pass (albeit a good one) of a
typical low Earth orbit satellite receiver. In comparison, the
upper-quartile pass receives 279317bit raw key (348896 de-
tections) with an average of 3.5% QBER, but this is insuffi-
cient to produce nonzero secure key with finite-sized effects
considered (the asymptotic secure key is 17916bit). Simi-
larly, the median pass with 43375bit raw key (82470 detec-
tions) and average 4.4% QBER also cannot extract nonzero
finite-sized secure key (asymptotic, 877bit).
Improvements to the source could mitigate finite-sized sta-
tistical effects. By adjusting the photon and pulse count
parameters, we can predict the performance of a 400MHz
source that produces 3/4 signal (i.e. a 300MHz signal rate, as
per [19]), 1/8 decoy, and 1/8 vacuum pulses. With other mea-
sured parameters left unchanged, 21570bit secure key could
be extracted from a single upper-quartile pass. This is directly
comparable to the estimation of [19]—under better conditions
(e.g. Eν assumed equal to Eµ , intrinsic source QBER of 1%,
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FIG. 7. QBER and total loss of data sets reconstructed from mea-
sured data (shown in Fig. 5) for three representative satellite pass
conditions: best pass (top), upper-quartile pass (middle), and median
pass (bottom). The predicted loss is based on an uplink with a 600km
circular Sun-synchronous low Earth orbit satellite at a wavelength of
785nm, with a receiver diameter of 30cm, a 2µrad pointing error
and a rural sea-level atmosphere. Smoothed loss follows the mov-
ing median determined at each 1s experimental data block selected.
Measured loss and QBER derive from the selected data, with shaded
regions indicating the QBER 95% credible interval based on a uni-
form Bayesian prior. For the best pass, we obtain 3374bit of secure
key, including finite-size statistical effects.
ν = 0.1, fEC = 1.22, and background estimate used only in
calculation of Eµ while setting Y0 = 0), a 111.3kbit secure
key was predicted.
Alternatively, finite-size effects could be reduced by com-
bining the measurements of multiple passes. For example, we
are able to combine the measurements of three upper-quartile
passes—each independently unable to produce positive finite
key—and thereby extract 165bit of secure key with finite-
sized statistics. (Significantly more median passes, around
215 combined, would be required to yield positive finite-size
secure key.) This might be a useful method to extract longer
secure keys from the results of multiple marginal or individu-
ally unfruitful satellite passes.
The quantities measured in the experiment are summarized,
in Table II, for each of the fixed loss cases and for each of
the three varying-loss satellite-pass simulations. These are the
values we use in Eq. (1) and Eq. (6) to determine the secure
key length.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated the feasibility of satellite QKD using
a quantum optical uplink by successfully performing QKD at
losses up to 56.5dB in the laboratory, with reduced computa-
tional requirements at the receiver, compatible with those that
can be achieved on a satellite platform. We have improved
over a previous high-loss demonstration [22] by implement-
ing complete QKD protocols, including twin-basis measure-
ments, error correction and privacy amplification. We have
also considered the effect of statistical fluctuations on the fi-
nite key length and have shown, by successfully performing
full QKD and by extrapolation with varying losses that match
those that would be experienced during representative passes
of a satellite, that such a system is viable.
Several improvements to our system are possible as a next
step, improving the key rate and moving our system towards
being immediately deployable. One necessary modification
to ensure secure QKD would be to employ a truly random
source at Alice, rather than a fixed-length repeating pseu-
dorandom sequence. Suitable high-speed electronics to im-
plement this in tandem with a source with increased pulse
rate could provide true security while significantly improv-
ing key rates above those reported here. While increased rates
would necessitate more processing at the receiver, our analy-
sis of computational requirements shows that detection rates
could be increased by an order of magnitude or more over the
demonstrated best-pass rate with processing at the receiver re-
maining feasible.
A particularly important challenge of satellite QKD yet to
be addressed is the varying time of flight due to the chang-
ing distance between the satellite and ground station during
a pass. For a 600km orbit the distance between the satellite
and ground station will vary by up to 7km/s [19], leading to
a time of flight varying by up to 23µs per second. Correcting
for such variation as part of the timing analysis is straight-
forward, in principle, but is beyond the scope of the present
work. Notably, though not of the same magnitude, varying
time of flight due to relative motion has been demonstrated in
the context of QKD for moving transmitters [52, 53] and, very
recently, a moving receiver [54].
Additionally, our theoretical prediction of loss for a satel-
lite pass is based on a 30cm diameter receiver at 785nm, while
our system uses a 5cm receiver and operates at 532nm. These
differences do not affect the proof-of-concept demonstrated
in this paper nor the basic design of our apparatus as the op-
erating principles are the same in either case. However, the
optimal parameters will need to be satisfied to ensure suc-
cess of a satellite uplink—the increased telescope diameter
10
TABLE II. Experimentally measured quantities for various loss conditions, including constant and varying losses simulating a satellite pass.
Loss includes both channel loss and receiver efficiency. Except for rates extrapolated to a 300MHz signal rate as indicated, all parameters
are based on measurements with our 76MHz pulsing laser source. Values here are incorporated into Eq. (1) and Eq. (6) to determine the
appropriate size of the privacy amplification matrix (Section II E), and thus the final secure key length. Where necessary for the finite-size
heuristic, uncertainties (1σ ) are also given.
Loss [dB] 28.8 34.9 40.1 45.6 50.3 52.1 56.5 Best Upper-quartile Median
Duration [s] 289 606 599 593 606 682 257 390 365 297
Mean detection rate [Hz] 41926 10464 3349 1167 427 301 186 1650 956 278
Signal detections (Nµ ) [×103] 11043 5739 1746 556 184 116 11.4 544 279 43.4
Decoy detections (Nν ) [×103] 82.5 57.2 16.1 6.72 1.98 1.19 0.156 5.63 2.88 0.489
Vacuum detections (N0) [×103] 43.8 34.2 14.4 7.75 5.30 4.19 0.612 4.64 3.32 1.50
Signal photon number (µ) 0.506 0.490 0.507 0.579 0.534 0.503 0.581 0.505 0.507 0.512
Decoy photon number (ν) 0.0392 0.0419 0.0515 0.0723 0.0517 0.0486 0.0592 0.0568 0.0571 0.0507
Signal QBER (Eµ ) [%] 3.54 1.94 2.53 2.84 4.85 6.06 5.98 3.12 3.46 4.35
Uncertainty (σ ) [×10−2 %] 0.566 0.581 1.20 2.26 5.14 7.24 22.4 2.15 3.52 10.0
Decoy QBER (Eν ) [%] 38.8 13.0 19.0 7.28 11.5 14.9 23.9 14.1 14.2 17.7
Uncertainty (σ ) [×10−1 %] 2.17 1.51 3.44 3.29 7.62 11.2 39.1 4.55 7.04 19.0
Signal vacuum QBER (Eµ0 ) [%] 50.8 52.0 50.4 50.6 50.3 50.4 50.5 50.6 50.7 50.7
Decoy vacuum QBER (Eν0 ) [%] 42.0 32.6 42.5 44.7 47.4 47.2 48.2 45.9 45.5 44.6
Signal gain (Qµ ) [×10−6] 568 136 41.8 13.5 4.34 2.43 0.634 20.1 11.0 2.10
Uncertainty (σ ) [×10−8] 17.1 5.67 3.16 1.81 1.01 0.715 0.595 3.00 2.08 1.01
Decoy gain (Qν ) [×10−7] 496 158 45.0 19.0 5.48 2.92 1.02 24.3 13.3 2.77
Uncertainty (σ ) [×10−8] 17.3 6.61 3.55 2.32 1.23 0.848 0.817 3.54 2.47 1.25
Single photon gain (QL1 ) [×10−6] 370 111 24.5 7.70 2.65 1.31 0.400 12.1 6.35 1.10
Single photon QBER (EU1 ) [%] 5.26 2.16 3.93 4.21 2.75 3.59 7.27 4.80 5.42 6.51
Vacuum yield (Y0) [×10−7] 20.6 7.39 3.14 1.71 1.15 0.806 0.312 1.56 1.19 0.665
Uncertainty (σ ) [×10−9] 9.85 4.00 2.62 1.94 1.58 1.25 1.26 2.41 2.07 1.72
Error correction efficiency ( fEC) 1.41 1.50 1.40 1.35 1.17 1.12 1.13 1.26 1.223 1.15
Raw rate [bits/s] 38211 9470 2915 938 303 169 44.2 1395 765 146
Sifted rate [bits/s] 19298 3802 1447 469 150 84.1 21.7 694 379 71.6
Secure rate (asymptotic) [bits/s] 2684 1761 285 79 24.5 3.95 0.510 120 49.1 2.96
Secure rate (finite-size) [bits/s] 1935 1539 152 5.39 – – – 8.65 – –
At 300MHz, projected [bits/s] 12806 8683 1190 234 – – – 372 59.1 –
Total finite-size key [kbits] 559 932 91.2 3.20 – – – 3.37 – –
At 300MHz, projected [kbits] 3701 5262 713 138 – – – 145 21.6 –
is necessary to reduce the geometric losses, and the 785nm
wavelength is necessary to provide the best balance between
diffraction, atmospheric absorption and turbulence, and de-
tector efficiency [19]. Together with a sufficiently accurate
pointing mechanism, these engineering challenges for imple-
menting a quantum receiver satellite payload are manifestly
achievable in the near term.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Chris Erven for valuable input and NSERC,
Canadian Space Agency, CFI, CIFAR, Industry Canada, Fed-
Dev Ontario and Ontario Research Fund for funding. B.L.H.
acknowledges support from NSERC Banting Postdoctoral
Fellowships.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal
Processing (Bangalore, India, 1984) pp. 175–179.
[2] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dus˘ek,
N. Lütkenhaus, and M. Peev, Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301 (2009).
[3] idQuantique, http://www.idquantique.com/ (2015).
[4] MagiQ Technologies, http://www.magiqtech.com/ (2015).
[5] H. Takesue, S. W. Nam, Q. Zhang, R. H. Hadfield, T. Honjo,
K. Tamaki, and Y. Yamamoto, Nature Photonics 1, 343 (2007).
[6] R. Ursin, F. Tiefenbacher, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier,
T. Scheidl, M. Lindenthal, B. Blauensteiner, T. Jennewein,
J. Perdigues, P. Trojek, B. Oemer, M. Fuerst, M. Meyen-
11
burg, J. Rarity, Z. Sodnik, C. Barbieri, H. Weinfurter, and
A. Zeilinger, Nature Physics 3, 481 (2007).
[7] T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, M. Fürst, R. Ursin,
F. Tiefenbacher, T. Scheidl, J. Perdigues, Z. Sodnik, C. Kurt-
siefer, J. G. Rarity, A. Zeilinger, and H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 98, 010504 (2007).
[8] D. Stucki, N. Walenta, F. Vannel, R. T. Thew, N. Gisin,
H. Zbinden, S. Gray, C. R. Towery, and S. Ten, New J. Phys.
11, 075003 (2009).
[9] Y. Liu, T.-Y. Chen, J. Wang, W.-Q. Cai, X. Wan, L.-K. Chen,
J.-H. Wang, S.-B. Liu, H. Liang, L. Yang, C.-Z. Peng, K. Chen,
Z.-B. Chen, and J.-W. Pan, Opt. Exp. 18, 8587 (2010).
[10] Z. Yan, D. R. Hamel, A. K. Heinrichs, X. Jiang, M. A. Itzler,
and T. Jennewein, Rev. Sci. Intrum. 83, 073105 (2012).
[11] B. Korzh, C. C. W. Lim, R. Houlmann, N. Gisin, M. J. Li,
D. Nolan, B. Sanguinetti, R. Thew, and H. Zbinden, Nature
Photonics 9, 163 (2015).
[12] H.-J. Briegel, W. Dür, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller, Phys. Rev. Lett.
81, 5932 (1998).
[13] C. Simon, M. Afzelius, J. Appel, A. Boyer de la Giroday, S. J.
Dewhurst, N. Gisin, C. Y. Hu, F. Jelezko, S. Kröll, J. H. Müller,
J. Nunn, E. S. Polzik, J. G. Rarity, H. De Riedmatten, W. Rosen-
feld, A. J. Shields, N. Sköld, R. M. Stevenson, R. Thew, I. A.
Walmsley, M. C. Weber, H. Weinfurter, J. Wrachtrup, and R. J.
Young, The European Physical Journal D 58, 1 (2010).
[14] N. Sangouard, C. Simon, H. de Riedmatten, and N. Gisin, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 83, 33 (2011).
[15] G. Gilbert and M. Hamrick, Practical Quantum Cryp-
tography: A Comprehensive Analysis (Part One), Tech.
Rep. MTR00W0000052 (The MITRE Corporation, 2000)
arXiv:quant-ph/0009027.
[16] J. E. Nordholt, R. J. Hughes, G. L. Morgan, C. G. Peterson, and
C. C. Wipf, in Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engi-
neers (SPIE) Conference Series, Society of Photo-Optical In-
strumentation Engineers (SPIE) Conference Series, Vol. 4635,
edited by G. S. Mecherle (2002) pp. 116–126.
[17] R. Ursin, T. Jennewein, J. Kofler, J. M. Perdigues, L. Cac-
ciapuoti, C. J. de Matos, M. Aspelmeyer, A. Valencia,
T. Scheidl, A. Acin, C. Barbieri, G. Bianco, C. Brukner, J. Cap-
many, S. Cova, D. Giggenbach, W. Leeb, R. H. Hadfield,
R. Laflamme, N. Lütkenhaus, G. Milburn, M. Peev, T. Ralph,
J. Rarity, R. Renner, E. Samain, N. Solomos, W. Tittel, J. P.
Torres, M. Toyoshima, A. Ortigosa-Blanch, V. Pruneri, P. Vil-
loresi, I. Walmsley, G. Weihs, H. Weinfurter, M. Zukowski, and
A. Zeilinger., Europhysics News 40, 26 (2009).
[18] C. Bonato, A. Tomaello, V. D. Deppo, G. Naletto, and P. Vil-
loresi, New J. Phys. 11, 045017 (2009).
[19] J.-P. Bourgoin, E. Meyer-Scott, B. L. Higgins, B. Helou, C. Er-
ven, H. Hübel, B. Kumar, D. Hudson, I. D’Souza, R. Girard,
R. Laflamme, and T. Jennewein, New J. Phys. 15, 023006
(2013).
[20] W. T. Buttler, R. J. Hughes, S. K. Lamoreaux, G. L. Morgan,
J. E. Nordholt, and C. G. Peterson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 5652
(2000).
[21] J. G. Rarity, P. R. Tapster, P. M. Gorman, and P. Knight, New
J. Phys. 4, 82 (2002).
[22] E. Meyer-Scott, Z. Yan, A. MacDonald, J.-P. Bourgoin, H. Hü-
bel, and T. Jennewein, Phys. Rev. A 84, 062326 (2011).
[23] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 72, 012326
(2005).
[24] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, Ph.D. thesis,
ETH Zurich (2005), arXiv:0512258.
[25] M. Tomamichel, C. C. W. Lim, N. Gisin, and R. Renner, Nature
communications 3, 634 (2012).
[26] Z. Yan, E. Meyer-Scott, J.-P. Bourgoin, B. L. Higgins, N. Gigov,
A. MacDonald, H. Hübel, and T. Jennewein, J. Lightwave
Technol. 31, 1399 (2013).
[27] R. Y. Q. Cai and V. Scarani, New J. Phys. 11, 045024 (2009).
[28] M. Lucamarini, K. A. Patel, J. F. Dynes, B. Fröhlich, A. W.
Sharpe, A. R. Dixon, Z. L. Yuan, R. V. Penty, and A. J. Shields,
Opt. Express 21, 24550 (2013).
[29] S.-H. Sun, L.-M. Liang, and C.-Z. Li, Physics Letters A 373,
2533 (2009).
[30] M. Curty, F. Xu, W. Cui, C. C. W. Lim, K. Tamaki, and H.-K.
Lo, Nature communications 5, 3732 (2014).
[31] V. Scarani and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 200501 (2008).
[32] D. J. C. MacKay and R. M. Neal, Electronics Lett. 33, 457
(1997).
[33] H. Krawczyk, in Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’94, Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 839, edited by Y. Desmedt
(Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1994) pp. 129–139.
[34] X.-Y. Hu, E. Eleftheriou, and D. Arnold, Information Theory,
IEEE Transactions on 51, 386 (2005).
[35] X.-Y. Hu, E. Eletheriou, and D. Arnold, “Source code for
Progressive Edge Growth parity-check matrix construction,”
(2003).
[36] D. Elkouss, A. Leverrier, R. Alléaume, and J. J. Boutros,
in Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on
Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 3, ISIT’09 (IEEE
Press, 2009) pp. 1879–1883.
[37] J. Martinez Mateo, Efficient Information Reconciliation for
Quantum Key Distribution, Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Politec-
nica de Madrid (2011).
[38] D. Pearson, in Proc. 7th International Conference on Quantum
Communication, Measurement and Computing (QCMC) (2004)
pp. 299–302.
[39] I. Lucio-Martinez, P. Chan, X. Mo, S. Hosier, and W. Tittel,
New J. Phys. 11, 095001 (2009).
[40] P. Chan, Low-Density Parity-Check Codes For Quantum Key
Distribution, Master’s thesis, University of Calgary (2009).
[41] C. E. Shannon, Bell System Technical Journal 27, 379 (1948).
[42] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information The-
ory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Process-
ing) (Wiley-Interscience, 2006).
[43] D. Elkouss, J. Martinez-Mateo, and V. Martin, Quantum Info.
Comput. 11, 226 (2011).
[44] U. Raviteja and A. Thangaraj, in The 14th National Conference
on Communications (India) (2008) pp. 79–83.
[45] Although MD5 is not cryptographically secure as methods to
modify a file while preserving its hash value are known, this
does not assist Eve’s effort to reconstruct the same key as Alice
and Bob.
[46] T. Tsurumaru, W. Matsumoto, and T. Asai, “QKD Post-
Processing Algorithms of Mitsubishi Electric Corporation,”
AIT QKD Post Processing Workshop 2011 (2011).
[47] R. M. Gray, Foundations and Trends in Communications and
Information Theory 2, 155 (2005).
[48] G. H. Golub and C. F. Van Loan, Matrix Computations, edited
by 3rd (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
[49] M. Hayashi, Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on 57,
3989 (2011).
[50] M. Tomamichel, J. Martinez-Mateo, C. Pacher, and D. Elkouss,
in 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT) (2014) pp. 1469–1473.
[51] H. Takesue, E. Diamanti, C. Langrock, M. M. Fejer, and Y. Ya-
mamoto, Opt. Express 14, 9522 (2006).
[52] S. Nauerth, F. Moll, M. Rau, C. Fuchs, J. Horwath, S. Frick,
and H. Weinfurter, Nature Photonics 7, 382–386 (2013).
12
[53] J.-Y. Wang, B. Yang, S.-K. Liao, L. Zhang, Q. Shen, X.-F. Hu,
J.-C. Wu, S.-J. Yang, H. Jiang, Y.-L. Tang, B. Zhong, H. Liang,
W.-Y. Liu, Y.-H. Hu, Y.-M. Huang, B. Qi, J.-G. Ren, G.-S. Pan,
J. Yin, J.-J. Jia, Y.-A. Chen, K. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, and J.-W.
Pan, Nature Photonics 7, 387–393 (2013).
[54] J.-P. Bourgoin, B. L. Higgins, N. Gigov, C. Holloway, C. Pugh,
S. Kaiser, M. Cranmer, and T. Jennewein, Opt. Express 23,
33437 (2015).
